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Abstract 
To  sell  their  surpluses  of  maize,  the  main  staple  in  Benin,  farmers  may  choose  among  three  modes  of 
transaction:  they  may  sell  under  a  contract  with  itinerant  traders,  or  they  may sell  without  a  contract  at  the 
farmgate or on distant markets. It has been postulated that farmers may choose a profitable mode of transaction if 
they have good access to information on the prevailing market conditions. Using detailed farm household survey 
data from Benin, this paper applies the Nested Logit model to test this hypothesis. The results show that farmers 
are likely to opt for selling at the farmgate without a contract if they have good access to information. However, 
such a decision may not be related to access to information through the government supported „Public Market 
Information System' but rather it is likely to be induced by access to information through farmers‟ own social 
networks.  
Key words: Public Market Information System, farmers, modes of transaction, liberalization. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Markets, formal and informal, are important for the poor who need them to sell their labor and 
products, to finance their investments and to be insured against the risks. When the markets 
function well, they stimulate the growth and open opportunities  for the poor (World Bank, 
2001). In particular, access to a well remunerated market is one of the most important factors 
influencing  farm  performance,  especially  in  developing  countries.  Improving  smallholder 
farmers' market access can thus be an essential component of the strategy of rural poverty 
reduction.  This  is  why  the  multilateral  and  national  aid  agencies  and  governments  in 
developing countries are favorable to the reforms aiming at releasing market forces. 
Since 1990, most reform efforts in sub-Saharan countries are targeted to agricultural market 
liberalization. Most of the governments have stopped intervening directly in the markets via 
marketing  boards  or  parastatal  organizations.  Market  Information  Systems  (MIS)  thus 
emerged  as an accompanying  measure of this reform.  They  were  very  much  intended to 
correct the asymmetries created by economic liberalization, giving more bargaining power to 
farmers, creating a more transparent, open trading environment and fostering more efficient 
market systems for all stakeholders (Tollens, 2006).  
Large  positive  impacts  are  expected  from  MIS,  but  empirical  works  to  show  them  are 
missing. According to Tollens (2006), there is a lack of impact evaluation of PMIS. Have 
poor farmers obtained better market access? Has the price discovery process by farmers been 
more efficient? Tollens shows that most of these questions remain unanswered. In this article 
we propose to  investigate  how  the Public Market Information System (PMIS) affects the 
patterns of smallholder participation  in the  market of a  major staple  food crop (maize)  in 
Benin. An econometric approach (Nested Logit Model) is developed and tested with micro 
data from Benin. The results show that farmers are likely to opt for selling at the farmgate 
without a contract if they have good access to information. However, such a decision may not 
be  related  to  access  to  information  through  the  government  supported  „Public  Market 
Information System' but rather  it  is  likely  to be induced by access to  information through 
farmers‟ own social networks.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief conceptual discussion 
on  the  link between PMIS and  smallholder  market participation  in the context of  LDCs. 
Section  3  presents  data  on  the  patterns  of  smallholder  market  participation  in  the  maize 
markets  and  characteristics  of  PMIS.  The  estimation  approach  is  shown  and  the  model 
variables are described in section 4. Section 5 presents and analyzes the results. Section 6 
concludes.  
2  PUBLIC  MARKET  INFORMATION  SYSTEM  (PMIS)  AND  SMALLHOLDER 
MARKET PARTICIPATION IN LDCS 
A striking feature of agriculture in poor countries is that the majority of food staple producers 
opt out of markets, even when price incentives are offered to them in order to break out from 
this „perverse‟ optimal choice (Barrett, 2008). Since the pioneering works of de Janvry et al. 
(1991)  and  Goetz  (1992),  various  conceptual  and  empirical  works  have  been  applied  to 3 
analyze this problem, inspired more or less by transaction-cost theories. They confirm that 
subsistence agriculture trap, in poor countries, is the result of high market entry costs, the 
most prominent being the cost of access to  information.  This  is the  main reason  why the 
implementation of PMIS is being encouraged. However, the literature also points out that to 
design  a  comprehensive  policy  package  to  eliminate  the  subsistence  trap  is  problematic. 
Additional analysis is therefore useful. 
The review of the literature indicates a gap, which, if filled, could be a good starting point for 
improving the policy agenda. Indeed, until now the smallholder market participation research 
agenda focus mostly on the (discrete) decision to participate or not in the market as well as the 
intensity of the participation. Detailed analysis on the “success stories” of those smallholders 
who take the risk to participate into the markets is still missing. What types of arrangements 
do they submit for when selling their surpluses (are these arrangements contractual or not; if 
not, do they sell at the farmgate or on distant markets?). How do they perceive the benefits 
from the available arrangements and what determine the decision to select a particular type of 
arrangement?  
By asking such questions, obviously we intend to apply the tools of the New Institutional 
Economics to assess the patterns of smallholder market participation. In particular we exploit 
the  governance  approach  developed  by  Williamson  (1991,  2002).  In  the  Williamson‟s 
framework, the arrangements to which the different parties involved in the transaction over a 
good can submit are designated by the term modes or forms of governance. Market is one of 
these modes. But, the parties may also choose hierarchy or a hybrid form.  
One of the main characteristic of markets is that they imply autonomous relations between the 
parties while hierarchies involve authority relations (cooperation). The hybrid form exploits 
the advantages of the two polar modes (market, hierarchy) although it should not be viewed as 
loose amalgam of  market and  hierarchy but as a  form that possesses  its own disciplined 
rationale (Williamson, 1991). Williamson predicts that a particular mode is chosen always 
after comparison with alternative modes; in any case, it is the transaction cost economizing 
mode which is chosen and this choice is contextual. The regulatory framework, the economic 
environment and the characteristics of  the  good  under  transaction, all, play a role  in the 
selection of a particular mode of governance (hereafter mode of transaction).  
We exploit this framework to analyze the transactions for the major staple food crop in Benin 
(maize).  It  has  been  postulated  that  surplus  farmers  choose  among  several  modes  of 
transaction. With the availability of an institutional innovation such as a PMIS, the ranking of 
the  modes  of  transactions  may  change;  re-orienting  farmers  towards  the  mode  which 
economizes transaction costs the most.  
To test  this  framework approach, detailed  farm  household and  market surveys  have been 
carried out in important maize producing zones in Benin. Variation across farm households in 
the  patterns  of  modes  of  transaction,  in  the  use  of  PMIS  and  in  other  household  and 
transaction-specific variables is used to construct an econometric model which shows how a 
particular  mode  of  transaction  for  maize  is  chosen  by  smallholders.  To  the  best  of  our 
knowledge, Fafchamps (2005) is the only attempt to date, to implement a systematic analysis 
of the farmers‟ choice of modes of transaction for the agricultural products in the context of 4 
LDCs. While Fafchamps focused on an export crop (cocoa) we choose to examine the case of 
a  staple  food  crop  (maize);  we  also  extend  the  analysis  to  the  use  of  private  contracts 
(between itinerant traders and smallholders) in the marketing  of this crop. 
3 PATTERNS OF SMALLHOLDER MARKET PARTICIPATION IN THE MAIZE 
MARKETS AND THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PMIS IN BENIN  
In Benin, domestic agricultural  trade is dominated by maize.  The market share of this crop 
attained 40 to 50% (Minot et al., 2001). In  normal  years, the country  is self-sufficient  in 
maize.  As  until  1995,  Benin  has  a  surplus  of  maize  of  around  30,000  tons  which  are 
exchanged with neighboring countries (Niger, Burkina-Faso, Togo and Nigeria). The level of 
cultivation of maize differs between the South and the North because of variation in climatic 
conditions. Further, the  motivation  for cultivation  varies between  the two  regions. In the 
South, which is mostly humid, maize is a staple food, grown by farmers primarily to meet 
subsistence goals; there are two harvests per year (small and long rainy seasons). The North is 
semi-arid and has only one harvest and maize is almost a cash crop.  
The distribution of maize is regulated by a private market system which is integrated into a 
larger network of markets including markets in neighboring countries. Traders operate within 
a  spatial  network  of  both  formal  (periodic  spot  markets)  and  informal  market  places. 
Numerous  petty  traders  and  wholesalers  are  involved  in  the  business  but  most  handle 
relatively small volumes (1,000 kg per market day); a few large wholesalers, with substantial 
market power, are present however (Lutz, 1994; Adégbidi et al., 2003). 
The functioning of the maize market is well-documented (Lutz, 1994; Adégbidi et al., 2003; 
Galtier,  2002;  Tassou,  2004;  Ahohounkpanzon,  1992).  For  most  studies,  the  level  of 
transparency is not high and there are often difficult impediments to free entrance. This is not 
only a consequence of physical barriers but there are also  various  institutional barriers to 
trade; for example, powerful “corporations” of traders may prohibit entrance in the markets in 
certain localities and farmers are the most targeted for exclusion. 
Institutional innovations such as a Public Market Information System (PMIS) can be useful to 
reduce  these  imperfections.  The  government  of  Benin  has  received  grants  from  various 
organizations  (FAO,  GTZ,  etc.)  since  the  early  1990s  to  set  up  this  system  as  an 
accompanying  measure  of  economic  liberalization.  The  aim  is  to  improve  the  power  of 
farmers  and small traders in the bargaining process, to increase market transparency, to create 
open trading environment and promote efficient market systems that yield sufficient benefits 
for all stakeholders. 
Unfortunately, a comprehensive assessment of PMIS and  its  influence on the patterns of 
smallholder market participation, using micro data, cannot be found in Benin. This research 
has been initiated to fill the gap. In the specialized survey that has been designed, we collect 
data on the characteristics of PMIS  and detailed  household  and  farm characteristics on a 
sample of maize surplus producers in the department of Plateau in Benin. A closer follow-up 
has also been carried out on a sub-sample to examine the characteristics of each transaction of 
maize (mode of transaction, price and transactions-cost related variables for each transaction). 
In table 1 the components of PMIS are shown with the extent of use of each of them. Table 2 5 
presents data on key household and farm characteristics and the characteristics of the maize 
transactions in the study area. 
Table 1: PMIS and the extent of its use by farmers (N=241) 
Components of PMIS  Percentage 
Monthly market bulletin of ONASA  0%  
Community radio stations  43% 
National radio station   6%  
Posting of prices in market places  4%  
SMS service  0%  
Source: farm household survey, 2006/2007. 
In Benin, PMIS is one of the most important activities of the national grain board, “Office 
National d‟Appui à la S￩curit￩ Alimentaire (ONASA)” established in 1989 as an integral part 
of  the  economic  liberalization  policy  reform  in  Benin.  The  targeted  public  for  PMIS  is 
government, traders, farmers, consumers. As components the system includes the publication 
of  food  monthly  market  bulletins,  posting  of  the  prices  of  major  staple  food  crops,  in 
particular maize, in the market places across the country, broadcasting of prices and market 
information on radios (community radio stations, national radio station)  and, recently, a SMS 
(Short Message Service) is also offered.  This service is expected to be very effective, since 
there is these days a boom in the telecommunication sector. However, table 1 indicates that 
this SMS service was not used by the survey farmers. But a significant number (more than 
40%) have access to PMIS by following the broadcastings on market data carried out by the 
community radio stations.  
Preliminary descriptive data on the link between the use of PMIS, modes of transaction and 
producer price levels for maize, based on table 2, are interesting. In the survey area, three 
modes of  transactions  have been observed: contract with  itinerant traders,  selling  without 
contract on the village market, selling without contract on distant markets. Distant market is 
meant to indicate the closest urban market. An important feature of mode 'contract' in the area 
is that this mode is accompanied by an offer of credit by itinerant traders to farmers. The data 
indicate that enforcement problem with the contract system is minimum in the area. Table 2 
indicates that, indeed, both expected and received (producer) prices differ across the modes of 
transaction. The data also suggest that both prices are, in general, much  higher with PMIS, 
indicating that farmers can extract higher benefits from the transactions of maize if PMIS is 
provided. This preliminary result will be tested using a systematic (econometric) analysis. 6 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics on the characteristics of maize sales and maize farmers 
Variables 
Modes of transaction 
All  Contract  Village market  Distant market 
Percentage of farmers in each mode of transaction   34.7  45.1  20.2  100 
Number of transactions = 1 (%)  23.4  12.1  6.4  41.9 
Number of transactions = 2 (%)  5.7  12.1  3.2  21.0 
Number of transactions ≥ 3 (%)  5.6  21.0  10.5  37.1 
Ex-ante information on alternative market prices 
through PMIS (% of farmers)  12.1  17.7  6.5  36.3 
Ex-ante information on alternative market prices 
through farmers' own social networks (% of 
farmers)  8.9  24.2  11.3  44.4 
No ex-ante information on alternative market prices 
before selling maize (% of farmers)  13.7  3.2  2.4  19.3 
Expected sale (producer) price for maize 
(FCFA/kg)  114.8  120.2  116.0  117.5 
                          With PMIS  133.4  119.5  132.9  126.5 
                          Without PMIS  104.8  120.6  108.0  112.3 
Sale (producer) price received  (FCFA/kg)  70.2  84.3  77.3  78.0 
                          With PMIS  89.5  87.5  96.7  89.8 
                          Without PMIS  59.8  82.3  68.2  71.3 
Net sale (producer) price received  (FCFA/kg)  66.3  82.3  66.7  73.6 
Marketing costs (FCFA/kg)  3.9  2.1  10.7  4.4 
Transport costs (FCFA/kg)  0.9  0.3  5.6  1.6 
Distance travelled (km)  4.2  2.3  11.4  4.8 
Duration of a transaction (hours)  3.8  3.1  4.1  3.5 
Age of farmer (number of years)  46.9  43.5  45.4  45.1 
Number of wives =1 (%)  10.5  20.2  4.8  35.5 
Number of wives = 2 (%)  16.9  19.4  12.9  49.2 
Number of wives≥ 3 (%)  7.3  5.7  2.4  15.3 
Household head cereal trade experience (years)  23.6  24.0  26.3  24.3 
Household head education (years)  2.3  2.0  3.9  2.4 
Household size (number of persons)  11.4  8.9  11.2  10.2 
Farmers who live in Pobe (%)  7.3  28.2  7.3  42.7 
Large-scale farmers (%)  24.2  7.3  9.7  41.1 
Medium-scale farmers (%)  9.7  5.7  17.7  33.1 
Small-scale farmers (%)  0.8  20.2  4.8  25.8 
Opinion about entry barriers on distant markets  (% 
of farmers)  21.0  14.5  3.2  38.7 
Adopters of improved variety of maize (%)  31.4  32.3  17.0  80.7 
Share improved variety in total production of maize 
(%)  98.1  100.0  94.4  98.2 
75% of the marketable surplus is sold in the lean 
season – January to June (% of farmers)  20.2  18.5  7.3  46.0 
Source: Farm household survey, 2006/2007 
4 ESTIMATION APPROACH AND DATA 
4.1 Specification of the Nested Logit 
Farmers may choose among three modes of transaction: contract, village market and distant 
market. So, we have a case of discrete choice models in the context of random utility theory. 
In such a situation it is a multinomial logit model (MNL) which is usually applied. But the 
MNL assumes proportional substitution patterns IIA. To relax this strong assumption of the 7 
multinomial (or conditional) logit model, we have chosen to apply the Nested Logit model 
which has become an important tool for the empirical analysis of discrete outcomes (Heiss, 
2002; Silberhorn et al., 2008). The Nested Logit model is the most often used  hierarchical 
model in marketing (Suarez et al. 2004) and can be used for modeling in any situation where 
subsets of alternatives share unobservable utility components (Ben-Akiva and Lerman 1985). 
In Random Utility Maximization (RUM) Models, econometricians assign a utility level  ij U to 
each alternative  1,2,...., jJ   for each decision maker  1,2,...., iI  . The decision makers are 
assumed to choose the alternative from which they derive the highest utility. The utilities are 
determined by a large number of characteristics of the decision maker and the alternatives. 
The researchers have information on some of these determinants, but not on all (Heiss, 2002). 
This is reflected by splitting the utilities into a deterministic part  ij V and a stochastic part  ij  :  
(1) ij ij ij UV 
  
The probability  ij P  that individual  i chooses some alternative  j  is equal to the probability 
of  ij U being the largest of all  12 , ,..., i i iJ U U U . With    1... i yJ   denoting the alternative that 
decision maker  i chooses, this probability is:  




ij i ij ik
ik ij ij ik
P P y j P U U k J k j
P V V k J k j 
     
      

 Given  the  deterministic  parts  of  the  utility  functions  12 , ,..., i i iJ V V V ,  this  probability  will 
depend on the assumptions on the distribution of the stochastic error terms  12 , , ... i i iJ    . The 
multinomial  logit (MNL) and conditional  logit (CL)  models are probably the  most widely 
used tools for analyzing discrete dependent variables. In these models it is assumed that the 




   , which  implicitly sets  the scale of  the  utilities. Instead,  the  Random  Utility 
Maximization  Nested  Logit  (RUMNL)  model  assumes  a  generalized  version  of  this 
distribution.  This  special  form  of  the  „Generalized-Extreme  Value‟  (GEV)  distribution 
extends the „Extreme-Value Type I‟ distribution by allowing the alternatives within a nest to 
have  mutually  correlated  error  terms.  This  distribution  takes  into  account  the  degree  of 
independence ( k  ) in unobserved utility among the alternatives in nest  k . A higher value of 
k  means  greater  independence  and  less  correlation.  The  statistic  1 k     is  a  measure  of 
correlation, in the sense that as  k   rises, indicating less correlation, this statistic drops (Train, 
2003). So, When  1 k    for all  k , representing independence among all the alternatives in all 
nests, the GEV distribution becomes the product of independent extreme-value terms. In this 
case, the Nested Logit model reduces to the standard logit model.  
The deterministic utility components  ij V may consist of different types of determinants.  8 
  alternative-specific constants  j  for all but one (the reference) alternative should enter 
the model. They capture choice probabilities relative to the reference alternative that 
cannot be attributed to the other explanatory variables.  
  individual-specific  variables  describe  characteristics  of  the  decision  maker.  These 
variables  may  influence  the  relative  attractiveness  of  the  alternatives.  Prominent 
examples  are  socio-economic  variables  like  household  income,  household  head 
education, household head age, household head cereal trade experience or household 
land  owned,  etc.  They  are  collected  in  a  vector  i z   for  each  decision  maker 
1,2,...., iI  . A parameter  vector  j    for each alternative  j   is  associated  with  the 
individual-specific variables. Since only utility differences are relevant for the choice, 
the parameters  for one (the reference) alternative  have  to be  normalized  to  zero  for 
purposes  of  identification.  The  other  parameters  can  be  estimated  freely.  They 
represent the effect of the individual-specific variables on the utility of the respective 
alternatives relative to the reference alternative. 
  alternative-specific variables  vary both over  individuals and alternatives. Prominent 
examples  are  the  expected  sale  (producer)  price  for  maize,  distance  to  market, 
transport costs, etc. These variables will be collected in a vector  ij x  for each decision 
maker  1,2,...., iI  and for each alternative  1,2,...., jJ  . They may enter the utilities 
in two different ways. Since the variation over alternatives provides additional ground 
for identification, a separate parameter for each alternative is statistically identified. A 
parameter  j  is estimated  for  each alternative  1,2,...., jJ   or  the  researcher  may 
often want to constrain the coefficients  j   of alternative-specific variables to be equal 
for  each  alternative.  In  this  case,  only  a  joint  coefficient  β  is  estimated  for  all 
alternatives. This is possible because of the variation of  ij x  over the alternatives. In 
this  case,  we  will  call  these  variables  generic  variables  and  add  the  restriction: 
1,2,...., . j jJ       According  to  Heiss  (2002),  the  introduction  of  a  generic 
variable into the model improves the estimates and makes it possible to interpret the 
coefficient considered as being the implicit value of the variable in terms of utility.  
Including all these variables, the deterministic part of the utility  ij V can, in general, be written 
as:  ij j ij j i j V x z        
Let us suppose that we gathered the choices set into  Lsubsets („nests‟). In each group l , there 
are  l J   possible  choices. On  the  whole,  the  individual  has  12 L J J J J      possible 
options. In our case, the number of nests is  2 L   (figure 1). The group of the producers who 
has a contract with the traders has only one choice, therefore 1 1 J  . On the other hand, the 
producers with no contract have two choices: sell on the village market or on a distant market. 
So,  2 2 J    and,  consequently,  the  producer  has  the  choice  be tween  three 9 
options 12 1 2 3 J J J      . Denote the nest  to which alternative  1,2,...., jJ  belongs as 
j J :    : , 1, 2, ..., j l l J J j J l L    .  
 
Figure 1. Nested structure for the sale of maize's surplus 
Source: Farm household survey, 2006/2007 
In  order  to  develop  an  intuitive  expression  for  the  choice  probabilities,  it  is  useful  to 
decompose  them  into  two  parts.  The  probability  of  individual  i choosing  alternative  j  
  i P y j  , is equal to the product of the probability to choose some alternative in nest  j J , 
  ij P y J  ,  and  the  conditional  probability  to  choose  exactly  alternative  j   given  some 
alternative  in  the  same  nest  j J   is  chosen    | i i j P y j y J  ;  that  is 
      | j j j P P y j P y j y J P y J         
where the  individual subscript  i is  dropped  from  now  on  for  the  sake  of  a  more  concise 
notation.  In  our  example,  the  probability  of  choosing  to  sell  on  a  distant  market  
  tan P y dis tmarket    is  equal  to  the  probability  of  choosing  to  sell  on  market 
  market P y J  times the conditional probability of choosing to sell on distant market given a 
mode  of  transaction  "market"  is  chosen    tan | . market P y dis tmarket y J  This 
decomposition  follows  the  rules  of  conditional  probability  and  is  especially  useful  for 
thinking about the Nested Logit model. 
There are two different specifications of  the Nested  Logit  model  with different outcomes 
(Heiss,  2002;  Silberhorn  et  al.,  2008):  the  Random  Utility  Maximization  Nested  Logit 
(RUMNL)  model and the Non-Normalized Nested Logit (NNNL)  model. If there are  no 
generic coefficients  in the  model the NNNL and the RUMNL specification are equivalent 
(Heiss, 2002).  10 
The RUMNL conditional choice probability of choosing alternative  j  given some alternative 
in  its  nest  is chosen  is    | j P y j y J  , which corresponds to a simple Conditional Logit 
model for the choice between the alternatives in nest  j J . But the utilities are rescaled by the 
inverse  of  the  parameter  j    for  this  nest.  The  parameter  j    is  often  called  dissimilarity 
parameter  because  it  is  an  inverse  measure  of  the  correlation  of  the  error  terms  of  all 
alternatives within this nest: 














. The log of the denominator of this expression ( l IV ) is called 
inclusive value or inclusive utility in the nest  l. It corresponds to the expected value of the 
utility  individual  i  obtains  from  the  alternatives  in  nest  l :  ln
j l k j kJ IV V 
   .  So, 
















. The marginal choice probability for alternative  j  which 
is the full information likelihood contribution is:  















   

.  
If  a  nest  contains  only  one  alternative  (as  in  our  case) ,  it  is  called  a  degenerate  n est.  The 
dissimilarity parameter of degenerate  nests  is  not defined  in  the  RUMNL  model.  Since the 
degenerate nest  j J  only contains alternative  j , its inclusive value simplifies to  j j j IV V   . 
The dissimilarity parameter  j   cancels out of the choice probability. This is intuitive since the 
concept of (dis)similarity does not make sense with only one alternative. In the NNNL model, 
however,  the dissimilarity parameter of degenerate  nests does  not  vanish  from the choice 
probability and  may be statistically  identified. Without  generic  variables, the dissimilarity 
parameters are not jointly identified with the other parameters, so they can be constrained to 
any nonzero value. If at least one generic variable is included in the NNNL model, the  IV  
parameter of degenerate nests may be identified along with the other model parameters. This 
identification  comes  from  the  restriction  of  equally  scaled  paramet ers  jj   across 
alternatives  and  nests,  and  the  parameters  only  constitute  this  scaling.  A  conventional 
approach to restrict the  IV  parameter to be equal to unity does not result in a model that is 
consistent with the underlying RUM model. 
4.2 Data 
The data used in this paper come from a survey carried out in the communes of Pobè and 
Kétou  in the department of Plateau,  the  largest  maize producing  zone  in Benin. Previous 
studies suggest that market entry barriers are erected against producers and the non-residents 
traders in this region (Lutz, 1994; Adégbidi et al., 2003).  
A sample of 241 farm households were randomly selected among maize surplus producers. 
Detailed  data  on  the  characteristics  of  households  and  farms,  sources  of  information  on 11 
market conditions, agricultural financing and participation have been collected. In a second 
step, a sub-sample of 124 farm households was drawn to implement a closer follow-up over 
one  year (October 2006 - September 2007)  for each  maize transaction carried out  in  that 
period.  Each  month  enumerators  visit  the  households  to  collect  the  data.  In  total  323 
transactions  were  observed,  on  average  3  transactions  per  household.  For  each  of  them 
farmers are asked to give a description: where the maize is sold, whom to, how much was 
sold, at what price, the kinds of arrangements used and other aspects of transactions. Data at 
community-level were also collected (identification of farmers' unions and analysis of their 
role in the cereal markets). 
Table 2 describes the characteristics of the maize transactions and maize farmers for the sub-
sample comprising 124 farmers. 
For the three modes of transaction observed in the survey area the percentages are :  35% for 
the mode „contract with itinerant traders‟, 45% for „selling without contract on the  village 
market‟ and 20% for „selling without contract on a distant market‟.  
The average household size is 10 persons. Average years of schooling for the household head 
is  limited (2.4).  The  highest  level of schooling  is  found among  farmers selling on distant 
markets (almost 4 years). Mean age of the household head is 45 years, and the number of 
years of experience  in cereal trade  is 24.  Market entry barriers are perceived as  high by 
almost 40% of the respondents, from which more than 50% are those that have chosen to sell 
under contract; farmers who sell to distant markets hardly see any barriers to trade.  
Three categories of farmers have been formed based on the size of the maize area. (1) large: ≥ 
6 ha – 41%; (2) medium : 3-5.5 ha – 33%: (3) small: < 3 ha – 26%. Table 2 shows that more 
than 50% of large farmers sell under contract. Most of the small farmers (78%) opt for selling 
without  contract  on  the  village  market.  Maize  yield  are  1973  kgha
-1,  2104kgha
-1  and 
1646hakg
-1 for large, medium and small farmers respectively. 
The percentage of farmers who are informed about PMIS and used it is 36.3%. Among them 
47% and 18% sell, without contract, on the village and distant  markets, respectively. It  is 
useful to indicate that many of those who decide to sell under contract also show interest into 
the PMIS.   
Apart  from PMIS,  farmers  use additional sources of  information (say  through own social 
networks) about market conditions. The percentage is 44%. From this, the majority (55%) are 
those  who sell on  the  village  market and 25%  is obtained  for  those  who  sell on distant 
markets.  
5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
As  indicated earlier, there are two different specifications of the Nested  Logit  model with 
different outcomes (Heiss, 2002; Silberhorn et al., 2008): the Random Utility Maximization 
Nested Logit (RUMNL) model and the Non-Normalized Nested Logit (NNNL) model. The 
estimated coefficients from RUMNL model can be readily interpreted and simple tests like 
asymptotic t tests directly test hypotheses of interest. This holds irrespective of the type of 
included explanatory variables and specified nesting structure. But, the estimated parameters 12 
from NNNL  model  may  not be  interpreted as  the structural parameters of an  underlying 
Random Utility Maximization model as many researchers tend to do (Heiss, 2002). If there 
are only alternative-specific coefficients in the model, the Nested Logit specification chosen 
can  be  accommodated  merely  by  a  nest-specific  re-scaling  of  the  estimated  coefficients 
obtained  from  the NNNL software before  interpretation. As soon as a  generic coefficient 
enters  the  model,  the  NNNL  model  is  not  consistent  with  random  utility  theory  without 
imposing  restrictions on the scale parameters. But these restrictions on the parameters are 
often  counterintuitive  and  undesired  (Heiss,  2002).  It  is  why  it  is  important  to  run  the 
RUMNL  model. In  many publications,  the  specification  used  is  not explicitly  mentioned 
(Silberhorn et al., 2008) and this a source of confusion. Since it is possible to estimate the 
Random Utility Maximization Nested Logit (RUMNL) model with Stata 9 or Stata 10, we 
implement the preferred RUMNL model with the package nlogitrum in Stata 10.  
The dependent variable is mode of transaction: sale under contract (contract, c), sale in the 
village  market without contract (village  market,  v) and sale  in the distant  market  without 
contract (distant market, m). Sale on the village market is the base category. The functions of 
utility  j V  of the three alternatives are defined as follows: 
v PE v CO v DI v DU v v V PE CO DI DU                
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where:  
PE  =  Expected sale (producer) price for maize  
CO  =  Marketing costs  
DI  =  Distance to the market  
DU  =  Duration of a transaction 
EXP  =  Household head cereal trade experience (years) 
INST  =  Household head education 
T  =  Household size 
COM  =  1 if the residence of the head household is Pobe (regional fixed effects) 
GP  =  1 if the maize producer belongs to the category of large-scale farmers 
PM  =  1 if the maize producer belongs to the category of medium-scale farmers 
BAR  =  1 if the producer estimates that there exist entry barriers on the distant (urban) markets  
VAR  =  Share of improved variety in total production of maize (%) 
PMIS  =  1 if the farmer uses the Public Market Information System to obtain data about the market 
price before deciding to sell maize 
CPV  =  1 if the farmer has information about the market price before deciding to sell maize without 
using PMIS 
PER  =  1 if the largest share of the  maize sold  (75% minimum) is  exchanged during the lean 13 
season - January to June 
In the model, we introduce four alternative-specific variables:  expected sale (producer) price 
for  maize (PE),  marketing costs paid  for selling  maize (CO), distance to  market (DI) and 
duration of a transaction (DU). All these attributes of mode of transaction are introduced into 
the model like generic variables taking into account the advantages related to that.  
Variables like age of the household head, capacity of negotiation, quality of the road  which 
connects to distant markets were also included in the regression in preliminary analyses.  But 
they were not finally selected for various reasons, in particular they were found to be strongly 
correlated  with  other  variables  of  the  model.  For  the  variable  „age‟,  we  found  that  its 
coefficient is not significant and it is also strongly correlated with the variable household head 
cereal trade experience (years) whose coefficient is significant. „Capacity of negotiation‟ is 
found to be positively correlated with variables capturing access to information about market 
prices;  it  may  be  that  farmers  who  have  access  to  price  data  before  selling  gain  more 
bargaining power. 
As the model is partially degenerated on the level of the contract, the IV parameter doesn't 
exist for RUMNL model. The IV parameter for market is within the unit interval and implies 
that this model is consistent with Random Utility Maximization.  
Table 3 presents empirical results of the RUMNL and the Conditional Logit models. Both 
models  seem  to  fit  the  data  fairly  well.  However,  because  of  the  earlier  conceptual 
discussions, only the results for the RUMNL model will be discussed.  
The  model  results show  that  farmers are  likely to opt  for selling on the village or distant 
markets if they have good access to information. However, such a decision may not be related 
to  access  to  information  through  the  government  supported  „Public  Market  Information 
System' but rather it  is likely to be induced by access to information through farmers‟ own 
social  networks. Indeed,  it  has been  found that the coefficients  for PMIS are  negative as 
expected but insignificant. In contrast, the coefficient of the variable "Ex-ante information on 
alternative  markets prices through  farmers' own  social  networks  without PMIS (CPV)"  is 
negative and significant for transaction mode "contract". The negative sign of this coefficient 
seems to say that farmers are prepared to avoid contractual arrangements with itinerant traders 
when they have access to information through their own social networks; rather they prefer to 
use  market  (village  market or distant  market)  for  maize  transaction.  However,  it  may be 
useful to indicate that the model does not indicate clearly in this case what is the dominant 
mode of transaction between selling on the village market or on a distant market. This result 
does not invalidate the role of PMIS but rather it tends to reinforce the importance of this 
system. The message is that the government-supported MIS in Benin needs to be improved to 
be effective.  
The result shows also that the  farm  size  has an effect on the  modes of  transaction.  They 
indicate that large-scale and medium-scale farmers (i.e those with larger surpluses) are more 
prepared to accept a contract with itinerants traders for selling their maize surpluses; small-
scale farmers opt for the market (village or distant). Given that this result is obtained after 
controlling the model for PMIS, interesting conclusions can be derived. Given that the use of 
PMIS induces higher received prices as table 2 seems to show, this means that 'big' farmers 14 
may  use purposively PMIS to  improve benefits  from  transactions  while  remaining  under 
contract. Contract may not be the best choice and we have seen that as soon as access to 
information is facilitated farmers tend to break out from this mode of transaction. Therefore 
the question arises 'why does this  mode persist?'  A plausible answer  is  that  farmers  lack 
access to credit;  indeed a key advantage of contract  in the study area  is that this  mode  is 
accompanied by an offer of credit by itinerant traders. It may be useful to find out how the 
patterns of modes of transaction will be altered if farmers are offered an alternative source of 
credit in addition to the implementation of PMIS.  
Table 3:  Nested and conditional logit models for the choice of the modes of transaction for 
maize 
Variables  Nested Logit  Conditionnel Logit 
Alternative-specific constants 
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IV Parameters (inclusive value) 
Contract  _  _ 
Market  0.722 
(1.44) 
_ 
Model parameters adjustment 
Numbers of observations   372  372 
Log likelihood  -87.137629  -87.259786 
LR chi




2  _  0.3595 
Prob > chi2          0.0000  0.0000 
In the brackets are reported statistics Z, *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
Source: Farm household survey, 2006/2007. 
Two additional results from the model can be mentioned. It has been found that none of the 
alternative-specific variables influences the choice of the modes of transaction. Higher years 
of experience  in cereal  trade  for  the  household  head (EXP)  induces  higher probability of 
opting for the market (village or distant) where probably higher benefits can be extracted. 
This result combined with those found  for the variable 'access to information' points to the 
idea that implementing a training program in the area of food  marketing for farmers can be 
very useful. As Shepherd (2000) emphasizes agriculture extension services must also be able 
to help producers to obtain information about market opportunities, to find buyers, to decide 
about quantity to produce, quantity to sell, to whom to sell, where to sell and when to sell, etc. 
Unfortunately such programs are often absent from the agenda of the extension administration 
in Benin or they are placed at the bottom on the list of priorities.  
6 CONCLUSIONS 
This paper shows  how different  transactions-cost  related  variable  influence decisions and 
outcomes of  farm-households  in rural  Benin.  In particular,  it  investigates  how  the Public 16 
Market Information System (PMIS) affects the mode of transaction for the major staple food 
crop (maize).  
To sell their surpluses of maize, the main staple in Benin, farmers may choose among three 
modes of transaction, each of which yields a different benefit: they may sell under a contract, 
established at the onset of the crop season with itinerant traders, or they may sell without a 
contract at the farmgate (village market) or on distant (urban) markets. It has been postulated 
that  farmers  may  choose  a  profitable  mode  of  transaction  if  they  have  good  access  to 
information on the prevailing market conditions. Using detailed farm household survey data 
from  Benin, this paper applies the Random Utility  Maximization Nested  Logit (RUMNL) 
model to test this hypothesis. The results show that farmers are likely to opt for selling at the 
farmgate or on distant markets  without a contract if they have good access to information. 
However,  such  a  decision  may  not  be  related  to  access  to  information  through  the 
government-supported „Public Market Information System (PIMS)‟ but rather it is likely to be 
induced by access to information through farmers‟ own social networks. This result does not 
invalidate the role of PMIS but rather it tends to reinforce the importance of this system. The 
message is that the government-supported MIS in Benin needs to be improved to be effective.  
It has also been found that higher years of experience in cereal trade for the household head 
(EXP) induces higher probability of opting for the market (village or distant) where probably 
higher benefits  can be extracted.  This result combined  with  those  found  for the  variable 
'access to information' points to the idea that implementing a training program in the area of 
food marketing for farmers can be very useful. 
The data indicate that many farmers opt for a contract rather than to sell freely in the market 
because  itinerant  traders  provide  them  with  credit  to  accompany  the  contract.  How  the 
patterns of modes of transaction will be altered if farmers are offered an alternative source of 
credit, in addition to the provision of PMIS, remain an open question.  
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